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Abstract
Until recently, computational constraints forced researchers in the discrete choice area to limit themselves to
very simple statistical models, such as the multinomial logit (MNL), in which choice probabilities could be
evaluated quickly on a computer. But the MNL only makes sense as a behavioral model under very special
circumstances. Recent advances in computation make it possible to estimate richer behavioral models that
generate very complex choice probability expressions. This paper discusses a number of possible avenues for
future research in the discrete choice area in light of these developments.
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I. Introduction
Discrete choice models have been widely used in marketing, transportation, economics
and many other areas to study both revealed and stated preference data. The most com-
monly used discrete choice model has of course been the multinomial logit (see McFad-
den (1974)). The appeal of the multinomial logit (MNL) arose from the fact that it is
simple to estimate. Choice probabilities and their derivatives take a simple closed form, so
that the likelihood for the MNL can be quickly constructed and easily maximized using
modern digital computers.
The problem with MNL is that it makes very strong assumptions about consumer
behavior. The assumption that has received the most attention is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which says that if a new alternative is added to a
choice set then choice probabilities for all existing alternatives fall proportionately. De-
spite the fact that this and other behavioral assumptions underlying MNL are untenable in
many contexts, researchers were still willing to use MNL because attempts to relax its
behavioral assumptions would typically lead to models that were computationally intrac-
table. Specifically, such attempts would typically lead to choice models in which the
choice probabilities took the form of high dimensional integrals with no closed form, as
occurs, for example, in the multinomial probit model (MNP).
Today we live in a rather different world. The speed of digital computers has increased
dramatically since 1974. This alone would make it feasible to estimate discrete choice
models in which choice probabilities have no closed form, provided the integrals that must
be evaluated numerically are below a certain dimension (say 4). But in addition, there
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have been important advances in estimation technology. The most important of these is the
development of highly accurate smooth probability simulators (see McFadden (1989),
Keane (1993, 1994), Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993)). These allow (approximate)
likelihood functions for discrete choice models to be constructed far more quickly than
would be possible using numerical integration.
In my view, most researchers in marketing, transportation, economics and other areas
where discrete choice models are widely used have not yet grasped the full import of these
events. Most interpret them to mean that it is now possible to relax IIA and estimate MNP
or other generalizations of MNL. The real meaning is far more profound. Given current
technology, it is no longer necessary to adopt what might be called a “statistical” approach
to empirical work in the discrete choice area—that is, the common practice of starting
with a particular statistical model that one knows is tractable (like MNL or now MNP),
and then adopting (ex-post) whatever explicit or implicit behavioral assumptions are
needed to fit the research question at hand into that framework.
Given current technology, it is often feasible to adopt a “theory-based” approach to
discrete choice modeling. Given a research question, one starts by writing down an
appealing theoretical model of the choice behavior of interest. Then, given assumptions
about the distributions of the stochastic terms in that model, one obtains expressions for
choice probabilities—and hence a statistical model that may be estimated. Since one’s
starting point was to write down a theoretical model that captures the salient features of
the particular choice behavior under study, there is no reason to expect that the statistical
model so obtained will resemble any textbook model like MNL or MNP. But in many
instances, it will still be possible to use modern simulation technology to evaluate the
required choice probability expressions and form the appropriate likelihood.
A good example is work on welfare program participation by Keane and Moffitt
(1996). We start with a utility based optimizing model of the behavior of single women
with children confronted by the complex array of constraints presented by the set of
programs that make up the US welfare system. The expressions for program participation
probabilities derived from this theoretical model are quite complex—in fact, the limits of
integration in the expressions cannot be expressed analytically. Nevertheless, it is
straightforward to use simulation techniques to evaluate the choice probabilities and form
the likelihood.
In my view, a major obstacle to progress in building our understanding of choice
behavior is that many researchers continue to adopt a statistical modeling approach. And
many of the research papers that are being published simply apply new statistical methods
to discrete choice data—rather than attempting to develop and estimate new and interest-
ing theoretical models of behavior. More careful attention must be paid to behavioral
theory if we hope to make further progress. In this paper I discuss a number of issues in
the discrete choice modeling area that are currently attracting attention, focussing on
theory-based approaches to modeling. The topics are: joint modeling of brand choice and
the timing and volume of purchases, modeling demand for new products, error structures
in choice models, and contingent valuation.
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II. Joint modeling of brand choice, purchase timing and purchase quantity: static
case
A number of authors have estimated statistical models for both the purchase timing and
brand choice processes. For example, Zufryden (1977) specifies an Erlang distribution of
interpurchase times in a category and a beta distribution of conditional brand choice
probabilities, while Jeuland et al (1980) alter the statistical model by adopting a Dirichlet
distribution for purchase probabilities. Shoemaker et al (1977) introduce correlation be-
tween interpurchase times and brand choice probabilities. Models with a no-purchase
option are also purchase timing models (e.g., Bucklin and Lattin (1991) specify a MNL
for brand choice, nested in a logit for purchase in the category).
Other authors jointly estimate statistical models of brand choice and purchase quantity
(e.g., Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988) estimate switching regressions for purchase quantity
where a MNL for brand choice determines if the left hand side is observed). Also,
Guadagni and Little (1983) and Keane (1996) estimate MNL and MNP models (respec-
tively) with brand/size combinations as alternatives, thus incorporating an aspect of quan-
tity choice, but ignoring purchase of multiple units.
Recently, some authors have considered all three of the timing, brand and quantity
decisions. Gupta (1988) specifies a separate statistical model for each. But Chiang (1991)
and Chintagunta (1993) set all three within a single utility maximization problem. They
appeal to the Hanemann (1984) result that when brands are perfect substitutes and quan-
tity is infinitely divisible, there is a separation of brand choice and quantity decisions. The
timing/brand choice part reduces to a multinomial choice model with a no-purchase
option, and a quantity regression can be estimated in a separate step. Achieving this
separation is important because, with multiple brands, the number of feasible brand/
quantity combinations quickly becomes astronomical, and it is not computationally fea-
sible to search over all combinations to find the optimal choice.
The Chiang (1991) and Chintagunta (1993) papers are laudable in that they attempt to
apply a “theory-based” approach by starting from an optimizing model of consumer
behavior. However, they err in applying the Hanemann (1984) results in cases where they
do not apply—the former to coffee that comes in 16 oz units and the latter to yogurt which
comes in 6 and 8 oz units. Even if all brands are perfect substitutes in utility, if quantity
is discrete one does not achieve a separation between timing/brand choice and quantity
decisions.
To illustrate, suppose utility is linear in the quantity of two alternative brands in one
category, and logarithmic in a composite other commodity. Substituting a static budget
constraint into the utility function one obtains the expression U 5 ab1 1 bb2 1 ln(Y 2
p1b1 2 p2b2), where bj is quantity of brand j, pj is its price, Y is income, and a and b are
parameters capturing preferences for the two brands. If quantity is infinitely divisible, the
consumer will make a purchase in the category if and only if p1 , aY or p2 , bY.
Conditional on purchase, the consumer buys only brand 1 if a/p1 . b/p2, and only brand
two otherwise (i.e., he/she buys only the brand that provides the most utils per dollar). For
example, suppose that a 5 0.2, b 5 0.095, p1 5 2, p2 5 1 and Y 5 20. Then the consumer
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will choose to buy only brand one, and he/she will set b1 5 5. But now suppose that the
brands can only be bought in units of 2 (i.e., 2, 4, 6, etc.). Then the optimal choice is to
buy both brands, and to set b1 5 4 and b2 5 2. The timing/brand choice and purchase
quantity decisions do not separate.
Thus, the computational problem of dealing with discrete quantity choice problems
remains open. At present, there is no alternative to exogenously imposing constraints that
keep the size of the choice set tractable, such as that agents cannot chose more than one
brand on a purchase occasion. Research on behaviorally appealing approaches to this
problem is needed.
Another important question is whether the decision to buy in a category and the brand
choice/quantity decision are best thought of as flowing from the same utility maximization
problem. For example, if store visits are costly, the decision to buy in a category may be
made prior to seeing prices, in-store promotions, etc., followed by a separate in-store
brand/quantity choice problem. Note that brand choice models that use shopping occa-
sions as the “time” line (by including a no-purchase option) implicitly assume that the
category purchase decision, but not the store visit decision, is influenced by prices or
promotions of brands in the category. In contrast, models that use purchase occasions as
the “time” line (excluding the no-purchase option), implicitly assume that the store visit
and category purchase decisions are not influenced by the prices or promotions of brands
in the category. It would be interesting to develop and estimate theoretical models of
consumer behavior that are explicit about the stage of the choice process at which prices
and promotions are observed.
III. Purchase timing, brand choice and quantity decisions of forward-looking
consumers
If consumers are forward-looking, and there exist intertemporal linkages in preferences or
constraints, then current demand will depend not just on current prices but also on
expected future prices. That is, consumers solve a dynamic rather than a static optimiza-
tion problem.
Intertemporal linkages may arise even for a perishable good like walleye pike, which
must be eaten soon after being caught. Suppose I go to the store and see that the price of
walleye is higher today than normal, so I expect it to drop next week. If my preferences
for walleye are additively separable over time, and if I cannot save, then I still face a static
choice problem—only the current price matters to my decision, not the price I expect next
week. But, if by passing up walleye this week I can save money for next week or raise my
marginal utility of walleye consumption next week, the fact that I expect next week’s price
to be lower may give me an incentive to defer the purchase.
For storable consumer goods and durable goods intertemporal linkages are obviously
important. In the former case an obvious source of intertemporal linkage is inventories. In
the latter case it is that the good, once purchased, provides a flow of consumption over a
long period of time. In either case, consumers will have an incentive to time purchases so
they buy when the price is “low” relative to expected future prices. This is easy to say, and
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introspection suggests that we all engage in such behavior. But forward-looking behavior
is very difficult to formalize in a model. The whole area of modeling expectations is
extremely difficult, both conceptually and operationally.
Economists often assume that agents form expectations “rationally.” Here, the technical
meaning of rational is to form expectations in a manner that is consistent with the “true”
model. When applied to a storable consumer good like detergent, this means consumers
know the process that generates detergent price fluctuations, and form expectations of
future prices optimally given that process. The computational demands of pursuing the
rational expectations approach in discrete choice models are formidable. In such models,
consumers behave as if they solve complex dynamic programming (DP) problems to
determine optimal choices. Hence, the researcher must also solve a DP problem to de-
termine consumers’ choice probabilities. An example is the recent paper by Erdem and
Keane (1996). The statistical model that arises from our theoretical model requires many
hours of supercomputer time to estimate, despite that fact that we used simulation and
interpolation techniques to approximate both the DP solution and the resultant choice
probabilities.
While the “full blown optimization” approach exemplified by the Erdem and Keane
paper is now feasible for many problems, many researchers will want to adopt less
computationally intensive alternatives, while still allowing for effects of expected future
prices on current demand. Some alternatives are: 1) assume expectations are formed
adaptively, so expected future prices are a simple function of past prices, 2) attempt to
measure expectations directly and include them in the model, 3) assume that agents make
choices using relatively simple rules-of-thumb, 4) assume that agents have short-time
horizons or only re-optimize on rare occasions (thus simplifying DP problems).
The problem with such simplifications, as well as with purely statistical models that
ignore entirely issues of how agents form expectations and form decision rules, is that
they can run a-foul of the “Lucas critique of econometric policy evaluation,” due to
Marschak (1952) and Lucas (1976). To understand the Lucas critique, consider the fol-
lowing simple example. Suppose after a few years of shopping I realize that my favorite
supermarket always cuts the price of my favorite detergent, say Era, from $4.00 to $3.50
per 32oz during one week of every month. Most other shoppers at the store realize this
too. So those who like Era adopt a decision rule that says: “Only buy Era if the price is
$3.50, and then buy enough so that my inventory will last at least 7 weeks (the longest
possible time until the next sale).” There are some random deviations from this rule (e.g.,
sometimes people may have big positive usage shocks that cause them to stock out and
deviate from the rule), but it is the dominant pattern of behavior. If one were to estimate
a MNL model for detergent choice in the store, the price elasticity of demand for Era
would appear to be enormous.
Now, suppose the store changes its policy, and starts to charge $4.00 for Era all the
time. The MNL model would predict that sales of Era would fall drastically—in fact,
almost to zero. But what would really happen? The shoppers who like Era would let 7
weeks go by and then be surprised to find that the price was still $4.00 in week 8. At this
point, it seems implausible that sales of Era would really drop to almost zero. Rather,
some shoppers would buy Era anyway because they prefer it sufficiently to other brands.
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Some would indeed switch brands. Some would check out prices in a different store, and
perhaps even switch stores. All the regular Era shoppers would realize that the pricing
policy had changed and start to develop a new decision rule. Clearly the MNL model
estimated on the data from the old monthly price cut regime will have little hope of
predicting what will happen under the new constant price regime. This inability of sta-
tistical models to predict effects of regime shifts is the basic idea of the Lucas critique.
To successfully forecast behavior after a regime change one needs to model how agents
tailor their decision rules to particular regimes. One needs a so-called “structural” model
whose parameters are “primitives” of agents’ preferences, information processing sys-
tems, etc., which remain fixed across regimes. Then, given any regime, one can solve for
the optimal decision rules of agents in that regime. In other words, the goal is a model that
is generalizable across regimes.
Only a “full blown optimization” approach in which agents choice of decision rule is
modeled can achieve this goal. In contrast models with fixed rule-of-thumb decision rules
would break down after the regime shift in the detergent example. One such model is a
“reference price” model, in which current demand depends in a fixed way on deviations of
current prices from average or “reference” prices (see Winer (1986)). In the detergent
example, if such a model was estimated on data from the monthly price cut regime, it
would predict almost zero demand for Era when price equals “reference” price. It would
therefore predict a drop in Era sales to almost zero in the constant price regime.
Nevertheless, simple statistical models which incorporate expectations (e.g., reference
price and other rule-of-thumb type models) may be very useful for predicting responses
to “marginal” changes within fixed regimes. If a statistical model is estimated on historical
data in which prices are drawn from a certain stochastic process, that model could be
reliably used to forecast demand tomorrow given a particular realization from the same
process. It is only if we attempt to use the model to forecast the effect of a fundamental
change in the stochastic process for price that we run a-foul of the Lucas critique. Despite
these concerns, some authors have recently applied control theory to derive optimal
pricing or advertising rules for retailers while taking statistical representations of con-
sumers’ decision rules as invariant to pricing or advertising policy (e.g., Chintagunta and
Vilcassim (1992), Kopalle and Winer (1996)). Such attempts ignore the basic message of
the Lucas critique that decision rules will change when policy rules change.
It is worth stressing that problem raised by the Lucas critique is really an identification
problem: If we observed data from many regimes, we could fit a purely statistical model
to the data, perhaps using regime indicators as explanatory variables, and successfully use
the model to predict changes in behavior across different regimes. So one response to the
critique is to collect more data.
Finally, note that the rational expectations assumption is not de rigueur in structural
modeling. Given costs of computation, it may well be optimal for agents to form expec-
tations in simpler ways. The optimal expectation formation mechanism may depend both
on the regime and more fundamental primitives that characterize the consumer’s infor-
mation processing costs and capabilities. Obviously, these are difficult issues that lie at the
cutting-edge of research in the social and behavioral sciences.
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IV. Modeling demand for new products
In thinking about demand for new products, it is useful to differentiate them along two
dimensions. First, is the new product only marginally different from existing products, or
does it represent a fundamental change? Second, are there “network externalities” asso-
ciated with the adoption of the new product?
An example of a new product that is only marginally different from existing products
is a new HMO that has a different monthly premium and covers different fractions of
prescription expenses than existing HMOs. In this case, it would be possible to estimate
a choice model on existing market or “revealed preference” (RP) data, which exhibits
variation in the attributes of interest, and use the model to predict demand for the new
product.
Data from stated preference (SP) choice experiments can also be used to estimate such
models (see Louviere (1988) or Hensher (1994)). In an SP experiment, respondents are
presented with a series of artificial choice sets. A set of attributes of the alternatives is
defined and varied across the sets. Thus, in contrast to market data, the researcher controls
the attribute variation in the data (Bunch et al (1996) provide evidence on the statistical
efficiency of various experimental designs). As pointed out by Adamowicz et al (1994),
there are often cases where attributes are collinear in market data, making it difficult or
impossible to predict the effect of independent variation in an attribute. In such cases SP
data has a key advantage over market data.
However, there are important potential problems with the use of SP data. Most obvi-
ously, respondents have no incentive to make choices in an SP experiment in the same way
they would in the market. Furthermore, even if people do respond as if they applied their
true utility weights to the attributes presented in the experiment, the SP choice situation
is typically somewhat different from a market choice situation. Some aspects of the
market choice context, such as search costs, are absent in the SP experiment. And in the
experiment alternatives are defined solely by the attributes presented, while in market data
there may be attributes observed (or perceived) by the consumer but unobserved by the
researcher, and these will be pushed into the choice model error terms.
Despite these potential problems, a number of recent papers have obtained a rather
striking result that lends credence to the use of SP experiments. In a large number of cases
in which both RP and SP data have been used to fit MNL models for the same good,
researchers have not rejected the hypothesis that the estimated utility weights are propor-
tional in the RP and SP choice models. Examples are Adamowicz et al (1994), Ben-Akiva
and Morikawa (1990), and Hensher and Bradley (1993). These researchers generally find
that the only significant difference between the MNL models estimated on RP and SP data
is the variance (or “scale”) of the error term (see Swait and Louviere (1993) for a
discussion of tests of this hypothesis).
A difficult question is why the process generating responses to SP choice experiments
should resemble that generating market choice behavior. In the papers mentioned above,
the choice tasks are all of a simple variety that is familiar to consumers (e.g., choose
among several varieties of detergent based on price and other attributes). Respondents
may get utility from demonstrating they can make rational price/quality tradeoffs in such
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situations. Or, the researchers may have successfully “framed” the choice tasks so that
respondents believe it is in their interest to reveal accurately how they value attributes
(because, say, that information will be used to design new products). An interesting
avenue for future research is to conduct SP experiments of varying designs so as to
discover conditions under which response patterns do and do not resemble those in market
data.
If the scale of the error term does indeed differ between RP and SP choice models it
creates a problem when applying the SP model to predict market share for a new product.
To deal with this, utility weights estimated from the SP data should be scaled proportion-
ately so as to set predicted market shares as close as possible to those in the historical
market data. This scaled model can then be used to forecast market shares after the new
product introduction.
Another issue is how to optimally combine RP and SP data to more efficiently estimate
choice model parameters. Given the processes assumed to be generating the RP and SP
data (e.g., the MNL in the papers cited above), one can form the correct likelihood for the
combined data. Each choice observation, whether from the market or SP data, contributes
one term to the likelihood. There is no reason to apply weights to the observations.
However, if consumers’ respond as if their preference weights are the same in the RP and
SP data, consumer heterogeneity will generate dependence across responses that must be
accounted for in forming the likelihood. There has also been work on how to incorporate
SP data on stated attribute importance with market choice data in order to obtain more
efficient estimates of choice model parameters (see McFadden (1986) and Harris and
Keane (1996)).
Now consider the problem of predicting market share for a fundamentally new product.
Examples of products that were fundamentally different when first introduced are lap-top
computers and cellular phones. Prior to their introduction all computers and phones had
the attribute “not mobile,” and these products introduced variability on that dimension for
the first time.
Such “fundamental change” may create an identification problem. Market data cannot
be used to estimate the effect of varying an attribute that is invariant in the market, unless
we have a model that specifies how that attribute maps into some more fundamental
determinant of utility. In a structural or utility based approach this is often the case. For
example, the welfare program participation model of Keane and Moffitt (1996) can be
used to predict how changes in aspects of program rules that are invariant in the data
would affect participation decisions, provided the rule changes affect agents’ income
conditional on participation. But if the model only specifies that certain attributes affect
utility, without specifying any more fundamental mechanism through which they do so,
then those attributes must vary in the data in order to identify their effect on choice.
Because of the identification problem in market data, SP experiments may often be the
only means to predict demand for a fundamentally different product. But fundamental
changes also create problems for SP experiments, because of the difficultly of conveying
to participants the meaning of a change along a dimension that is invariant in their
experience. One approach is to use computer simulation or virtual reality techniques that
help consumers understand the innovation (see Weinberg (1992) and Urban et al (1996)).
314 MICHAEL P. KEANE
Kluwer Journal
@ats-ss10/data11/kluwer/journals/mark/v8n3art6 COMPOSED: 04/29/97 10:27 am. PG.POS. 8 SESSION: 6
There is considerable scope for experimentation in this area. Another problem is that the
SP model will again need to be scaled to historical market choice data. And we cannot test
whether the utility weight for the fundamentally changed attribute “scales.”
Finally I turn to the issue of forecasting demand for a new product when there are
network externalities. A network externality arises when the utility I get from adopting a
product depends on how many other people adopt it. An example is the decision to adopt
a new word processing package from a startup software company (as opposed to an update
from a major vendor). If I am alone in adopting the new package, I face several problems.
For example, I will not be able to send documents electronically to others to print, since
they will lack the necessary software. And I will not be able to obtain support for the
package locally, since I will be the only person using it.
Thus, only certain segments of consumers will adopt the new package initially: those
who do not need to send documents electronically to others, those who are good at
deciphering software manuals, those with great confidence that many other people will
soon adopt the new package, etc. Later, after some consumers have already adopted, a
wider group of consumers may be willing to adopt, etc. This suggests using a sequence of
SP choice experiments to predict demand for the new product at different stages of its life
cycle. The state of adoption could be part of the framing of the choice task. That is: 1) no
one has yet adopted the product, no support is available, etc., 2) a certain fraction of the
population has adopted and a certain level of support is available, etc. At some point one
finds the level of prior adoption such that the same fraction of consumers would choose
to adopt, and this is the steady state adoption level.
Given this series of conditional choice models, one must translate the predicted growth
in market shares across models into real time. This is a difficult problem. One possibility
is to find a previously introduced product that is in some sense similar (including similar
initial and steady state adoption levels), and assume the diffusion time path will be the
same. Also, one could introduce questions about timing of adoption into the SP choice
task, so as to obtain the information needed to predict, given an initial market share, how
much time would pass before a certain fraction of additional people adopt. In the Urban
et al (1996) study on the electric car, “managerial judgement” was used to predict the
number of recharging stations available at different points in time. But this seems to skirt
the issue, since the state of infrastructure by any point in time will depend on cumulative
adoption decisions up to that point, which is what the choice model is meant to predict.
In principle, market data could also be used to forecast demand for a new product that
entails a network externality, provided the product is only marginally different from other
such products introduced in the past (e.g. an improved word processing package that is not
fully compatible with older versions). But, while historical data on consumers’ past
adoption decisions for similar products could be collected, such data appears to be rare at
the individual level. Further, the type of panel data needed to model the dynamics of
adoption as described above appears to be nonexistent. Thus, at present SP choice ex-
periments appear to be the only practical option in this context.
Finally, note that demand for new products may depend crucially on expectations.
Prices of many new products drop systematically with time, so expected future prices will
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affect current demand. And in cases of network externalities, expected future infrastruc-
ture will matter too.
V. Error structures in choice models
The “error term” in discrete choice models has often been treated as noise or intrinsic
randomness in behavior arising from unknown and unspecified sources. This is misguided.
It is important to interpret the error term in the light of behavioral models. To illustrate the
kind of misunderstanding that can arise from failure to do so, consider a simple random
utility model, in which there are heterogeneous preferences for observed and unobserved
brand attributes:
Uijt 5 aij 1 Pijtgi 1 Xijtbi 1 eijt (1)
Here, Uijt is the utility that i receives given choice of alternative j on occasion t. In market
data, t could index time, store visits, or purchase occasions. In an SP experiment, t would
index choice tasks. Pijt denotes price, and Xijt denotes an observed attribute of j (which for
complete generality I allow to vary over people and choice occasions). The aij denotes the
person specific intercept for alternative j, which can be interpreted as arising from i’s
preferences for unobserved attributes of j. The gi and bi are individual specific utility
parameters which are intrinsic to the consumer and hence invariant over choice occasions.
The eijt can be interpreted as occasion specific shocks to i’s tastes, which for convenience
I assume to be independent over choice occasions, alternatives and consumers.
Suppose I estimate a multinomial choice model, falsely assuming that the intercept and
slope parameters are homogeneous in the population. The error term in this model will be
wijt 5 aˆi 1 Pijtgˆi 1 Xijtbˆi 1 eijt (2)
where ˆ denotes the individual specific deviation from the population mean. Observe that









and the covariance between choice occasions t and t21 is
Cov(wijt, wij,t21) 5 sa
2 1 PijtPij,t21 sg
2 1 XijtXij,t21 sb
2 (4)
Equations (3) and (4) reveal two interesting consequences of ignoring heterogeneity in
preferences. First, the error variance will differ across choice occasions as the price P and
attribute X are varied. If one estimates a MNL model with a constant error variance, this
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will show up as variation in the intercept and slope parameters across choice occasions.
In an SP experiment context, this could lead to a false conclusion that there are order
effects in the process generating responses.
Second, equation (4) shows how preference heterogeneity leads to serially correlated
errors. That heterogeneity is a special type of serial correlation is apparently not well
understood in the marketing and transportation literatures. To obtain efficient estimates of
choice model parameters one should include a specification of the heterogeneity structure
in the model. But more importantly, if preference heterogeneity is present it is not merely
a statistical nuisance requiring correction. Rather, one must model the heterogeneity in
order to obtain accurate choice model predictions, because the presence of heterogeneity
will alter cross-price elasticities, lead to IIA violations, etc. This is just one example of
how paying attention to the behavioral source of the error terms in a choice model leads
to new insights into how the model should be estimated, interpreted and applied.
VI. Contingent valuation
Contingent valuation (CV) is a specific SP data technique in which the researcher attempts
to uncover the demand function for a particular good. This is typically done either by
asking a sample of consumers how much they are willing to pay for the good (the
“open-ended” approach), or by presenting consumers with various different prices, and
asking if they would buy the good at those prices (the “referendum” approach). The
fraction of consumers willing to buy at each price traces out the demand curve. Refer-
endum CV is a special case of an SP choice experiment in which price is the only attribute
varied, so only the complete attribute bundle the good represents can be valued.
As with SP choice experiments, a key advantage of CV over studies based on market
data is that it can be used to predict demand for goods that are fundamentally different
from any that are currently being traded in markets. As a result, CV has been widely used
to predict demand for public goods. An example of such a good would be the Porcupine
Caribou herd, whose existence provides utility (i.e., “existence value”) to many people.
Recently, CV has received a great deal of attention because of its use in litigation (such
as the highly publicized Exxon Valdez case) to assess existence values of public goods
damaged in environmental accidents. As a result, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) recently formed a distinguished panel of economists to evaluate
the use of CV in determining existence values. Arrow et al (1993) concluded that if a
number of stringent design criteria were met, then “CV studies convey useful informa-
tion,” although the report also suggests that few if any existing CV studies meet all these
criteria. One key criterion which the panel emphasized was that “the payment scenario
should be convincingly described, preferably in a referendum context, because most re-
spondents will have had experience with referendum ballots.”
The NOAA panel recommendation of the referendum format has raised controversy,
with researchers taking different positions on whether that format is more incentive
compatible and/or psychometrically reliable than the open-ended format. Consider first
the issue of incentives to misstate preferences. Suppose a CV study deals with a wolf
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conservation program. In an open-ended format, respondents are asked how much they
would be willing to pay in taxes to implement the program. Suppose a respondent wants
to see the conservation program implemented, and believes that the higher the mean
response to the CV question the more likely is implementation. However, he/she does not
believe that the mean response will affect either the form of the program finally imple-
mented or the cost in taxes (i.e., the respondent has a set belief about what the program
will really cost). In that case, the respondent has an incentive to report the highest possible
willingness to pay, subject to the constraint that the response look reasonable so it is not
discarded as an outlier. Analogously, in a referendum format, such a respondent would
have an incentive to answer “yes, I would vote for the referendum” no matter how high a
tax was quoted in the question.
As Green et al (1995) note, if the above scenario is changed only in that the respondent
believes the probability of program implementation depends not on the mean response to
the CV question, but rather on the fraction of respondents who indicate support for the
program (either by stating a willingness to pay that exceeds cost, or answering yes in the
referendum format when the stated cost is greater than or equal to true cost), then the
respondent has an incentive to be truthful in either format. For example, suppose the
respondent is truly willing to pay $100 for the program. It is then optimal for him/her to
express a willingness to pay of exactly $100, regardless of format, because this insures
that he/she is voting “Yes” contingent on the true program cost being less than or equal to
$100, and “No” otherwise. (An interesting question is how the respondent should respond
in the referendum format if expressing a willingness to pay of exactly $100 is not an
option).
Thus, Green et al (1995) argue that the referendum format should not be preferred to
the open-ended format on a priori incentive compatibility grounds. However, if one wants
an incentive compatible design the real issue is which format makes it easiest to frame the
question in an incentive compatible way. If one wants respondents to believe that the
probability of implementation depends on the fraction of respondents who vote yes, it
seems easiest to do this in the referendum format.
It is worth noting, however, that the NOAA panel did not prefer referendum CV
because of incentive compatibility concerns (that was a minor point in the report) but
rather stressed the fact that “most respondents will have had experience with referendum
ballots,” making it a task with which respondents are familiar. We do not yet understand
why and under what conditions choice behavior in SP choice tasks resembles revealed
preference behavior in the “scaling” sense described in section IV, but at this point it
appears likely that familiarity of the task is important—since agents have little or no
economic incentive to work hard on the task, the cognitive burden had better be small!
Green et al (1995) also argue that the emphasis on incentive compatibility in CV
surveys is misplaced, since few respondents will believe they can affect either the prob-
ability of program implementation or cost. They argue that avoidance of various psycho-
metric biases is likely to be the more important consideration in choosing between ref-
erendum and open-ended formats. For instance, they present evidence that in referendum
CV the quoted program costs act as “anchors,” such that respondent’s valuations move
toward the anchor with which they are presented.
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A potential explanation for anchoring is that it is a learning phenomenon. If we ask
people what they are “willing to pay” for a government program, those who support it
might respond by forming a guess of what it should cost, if implemented cost effectively.
And costs quoted in a referendum CV survey may be used as indicators of true program
cost. As Hanemann (1994) notes, a related response behavior is observed in experiments
where open-ended designs have been applied to market goods, in which “people are more
likely to tell you what the good costs than what it is worth to them.” This is not surprising.
Why should I be “willing to pay” more for a market good than the going market price,
even if at a higher market price I would still buy the good?
A key issue, in all SP task design is that the attributes and prices presented be believ-
able. In a CV task respondents may not believe the government can provide a certain
environmental amenity at a certain price, and in an SP choice task they may not believe
a manufacturer could provide a certain product attribute. In an SP task where the choice
is among software packages, I would ignore an indication that one had an easy to read
manual (since that’s impossible), and in a CV task I would not believe the state govern-
ment could restore the Minnesota river to pristine condition with a $10 increase in state
taxes. It is not obvious how people might respond in such contexts.
A key criticism of CV is that it is subject to “embedding” effects, whereby people
exhibit implausibly low marginal willingness to pay for increments to environmental
amenities (see McFadden (1994)). Such behavior may stem from scenario implausibility.
For example, suppose a person says that are willing to pay $100 to clean up the Minnesota
river, but he/she indicates they are unwilling to pay much more for a program to clean up
all the rivers in the state. The respondent may simply be skeptical of the government’s
ability to successfully implement the larger project.
CV has also been criticized on the grounds that respondents pay insufficient attention
to opportunity costs. But this is also true in SP choice experiments. For example, in Urban
et al (1996), the percentage of people indicating they would purchase a GM electric car
dropped substantially when other alternatives were presented explicitly. With market
goods it is often possible to deal with such problems by “scaling” an SP choice model so
its predictions align with observed market shares for previously existing products. But as
the NOAA panel noted, a fundamental problem in the case of public goods is that there
may be no market data available to make such adjustments.
But it is sometimes possible to compare CV estimates of demand for existence of public
goods to revealed preference data. For example, there have been actual referenda on
proposals to conserve forests. And some people are willing to pay a premium to help
preserve existence of natural resources by buying products like tuna caught in dolphin
friendly nets or recycled paper. A major research program is needed to compare behavior
in SP and CV choice tasks with behavior in market contexts. Much work along these lines
has already been done (e.g., Carson et al (1996), Cameron (1992), Bishop and Heberlein
(1979), Davis (1963) and the SP studies cited in section IV). But we are a long way from
having general rules for adjusting SP and CV choice models so they can reliably predict
behavior in market contexts—even when no market data exist to aid in calibration.
Finally, the referendum CV format posses a number of interesting statistical problems,
which are discussed at length in Hanemann and Kanninen (1996). An important theme of
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their work is that simple logit and probit models of the type usually estimated in the CV
literature rarely satisfy the restrictions of economic theory. This harkens back to my point
in section I that particular statistical models should not be the starting point for analysis
of choice behavior. Rather, one should start from sensible behavioral models and then
work out the statistical models that emerge.
VII. Conclusion
Recent advances in computation make it possible to estimate behavioral models that
generate very complex choice probability expressions. I argue that this should lead to a
fundamental change in mind-set among researchers in the discrete choice area. Given a
research question, one should start by developing an appealing theoretical model of the
behavior of interest, and then derive the implied statistical model. Given modern tech-
nology, it will often be possible to press ahead with estimation even if the statistical model
so obtained is quite complex. This contrasts with the traditional approach (often neces-
sitated by computational limitations) of trying to find a way to fit the research question
into a logit or other simple statistical framework, regardless of whether the behavioral
assumptions in the framework are sensible or appealing in the context under study.
In this paper I have considered several possible avenues for future research opened up
by these advances. These include: 1) joint modeling of the process by which consumers
decide on store visits, purchase in a category and brand choice, so as to shed light on the
role played by price and promotion activity at each stage of the process, 2) modeling
consumers’ choice of purchase decision rules in alternative price setting environments, 3)
combining stated and revealed preference data to estimate richer models of the demand
for new and existing products, 4) estimation of models which rich structures of preference
heterogeneity across consumers, and 5) estimation of models of the behavioral processes
underlying responses in SP and CV choice tasks. It is very exciting to be working in the
discrete choice area at a time when so many possibilities are opening up.
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